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NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
WOMEN V. SCHEIDLER: RICO
A VALUABLE TOOL FOR
CONTROLLING VIOLENT PROTEST
All Americans have a protected right of lawful civil disobedience. If the
form of civil disobedience exceeds first amendment protection, the pro-
test becomes unlawful. Good motives will not excuse the unlawful
conduct.'
INTRODUCTION
Anti-abortion protesters, in furtherance of their belief that abortion is the
actual killing of an unborn child, have often become extremists, endangering
the lives of others.' Such fanaticism is evident in a recent circulation of
"WANTED" posters containing the picture of an abortion-performing doctor.3
That doctor is now a murder victim, gunned down by an abortion opponent
during an anti-abortion protest.4 In one situation alone, anti-abortion protest-
ers were responsible for 23 acts of arson and attempted arson, 33 fire bomb-
ings and attempted fire bombings, 8 assaults and batteries on abortion clinic
personnel, 383 acts of trespass on clinic property, 84 acts of harassment, and
73 invasions or "blitzes" of clinics.' In another incident, an anti-abortion
protester kidnapped a doctor and his wife at gunpoint and threatened to kill
them unless the doctor agreed to stop performing abortions.
6
1. Jo Anne Pool, Note, Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle: A Message to Political
Activists, 23 AKRON L. REV. 251, 263 (1989).
2. See Patricia Ireland, Racketeering Law Should Cover Violent Opponents of Abortion,
HOUS. POST, Jan. 21, 1994, at A25. "[A]nti-abortion extremists have been responsible for
more than 600 criminal acts - including murder, death threats, arson, bombings, assault,
kidnapping, invasions and burglary." Id.
3. Brief of Petitioners at 6 n.3, National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 113 S. Ct.
2958 (1993) (No. 92-780). These posters were circulated by Defendant Operation Rescue.
Id.
4. Protester Guns Down Clinic Doctor; Abortion Opponent Surrenders in Florida, Is
Charged with Murder, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 11, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Clinic
Doctor]. Five months later, another doctor was shot by a woman who had sent fan mail to Dr.
Gunn's murderer. Seth Faison, Abortion Doctor Wounded Outside Kansas Clinic, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 9, 1993, at A25.
5. Brief of Petitioners at 7, Scheidler, (No. 92-780).
6. See United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1983). One author goes so far as
to compare anti-abortion protesters with Ku Klux Klan members. She states "They once
came in the night, wearing white hooded robes and brandishing fiery crosses, proclaiming
that God was pro-white and on their side. Now they come in the morning, wearing suits and
carrying incendiary posters, proclaiming that God is pro-life and on their side." Lisa J.
Banks, Comment, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic; The Supreme Court's License
for Domestic Terrorism, 71 DENY. U. L. REV. 449, 449 (1994) (quoting Constance A. Morella,
391
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In a recent attempt to discourage such illegal and dangerous behavior,
the United States Supreme Court held that the Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 7 could apply to anti-abortion protesters.'
This Note will examine the recent decision of the United States Supreme
Court in National Organization for Women v. Scheidler that allows courts to
apply RICO to non-economic enterprises. 9 This Note will first discuss the
problems that arise from protest, as well as a brief historical background of the
RICO statute. It will further analyze the legal reasoning behind the Supreme
Court's decision to apply RICO to anti-abortion protesters, and explore the
possible First Amendment implications of such a decision.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Anti-abortion Protest Becomes Violent
Since the 1960's, protesting has become a prevalent form of protected
speech and expression. 10 At the root of such expression lies strong ;.nd occa-
sionally fanatical beliefs in the areas of politics, religion and morality.1" In
1973, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Roe v. Wade legalizing
abortion.12 The Court stated that the right to privacy includes a woman's
Clinics Under Siege, WASH. POST, March 23, 1993, at A21).
7. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988). See
generally Irvin B. Nathan & Kenneth I. Juster, Law Enforcement Against International
Terrorists: Use of the RICO Statute, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 553, 560-65 (1989); G. Richard
Strafer, et al., Civil RICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody's Darling," 19 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 655 (1982); Barry Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49
FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 171-80 (1980); Mark Headley, Comment, Sedina v. Imrex: Civil
Immunity for Unprosecuted RICO Violators?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 419, 420-24 (1985).
8. National Organization for Women, 114 S. Ct. 798, 806 (1994).
9. Id. at 806. "We hold only that RICO contains no economic motive requirement." Id.
See generally Pool, supra note 1 (discussing the previous extension of RICO to anti-abortion
protesters). But see Anne Melley, Stretching of Civil RICO: Pro-life Demonstrators are
Racketeers?, 56 UMKC L. REV. 287 (1988) (stating that extending Civil RICO to pro-life
activists is going too far).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech .... " However, not all types of protest are protected. See generally Bruce Ledewitz,
Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, and the First Amendment, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 67 (1990)
(discussing the different kinds of civil disobedience).
11. Protest has occurred most notable in the Suffrage Movement, the Civil Rights movement
and various Anti-War movements. See generally Ledewitz, supra note 10, at 70-80 (discussing
past and present arenas in which protesters have been active).
12. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy includes a woman's
choice whether or not to terminate a pregnancy). See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, Nor
Piety nor Wit: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 6 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 379 (1974-75)
(providing an overview of Roe v. Wade); Philip B. Heymann & Douglas E. Barzlay, The
[Vol. 28:2
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choice whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 3 The decision in effect
created a new volatile area of protest, evidenced by two opposing views fre-
quently characterized as pro-life and pro-choice. 4
Protest surrounding the abortion issue has occasionally crossed the line
of being peaceful, turning violent and even criminal. 5 Such fervor continues
to draw Congressional attention, in part because violent protest disturbs the
nation's peace and order.'6 Because protest can and often does detrimentally
affect the interests of those targeted, 7 the affected groups and the Federal
government alike sought means to counter-balance the illegal activities of
anti-abortion protesters. 8 A recent development in combating violent protest
has been the application of RICO to anti-abortion protesters.
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
After much investigation into the problem of organized crime,19
Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U. L. REV. 765 (1973) (agreeing
with the decision in Roe v. Wade); Francis Olsen, Comment, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term:
Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1989) (viewing Roe v. Wade as a
compromise between an individual's right to abortion and states' rights to control abortion).
For thoughts on Roe v. Wade by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, one of the most recent of the Justices
appointed to the United States Supreme Court, see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Essay: Some
Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985).
13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. See Carolyn Grose, Note, "Put Your Body on the Line:" Civil Disobedience and
Injunctions, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1497, 1498 n.1 (1994). The term "pro-choice" represents
those individuals supporting a woman's right to have an abortion. Id. The term "pro-life"
represents those individuals who want to regulate abortion and views abortion as an issue of
killing an actual life. Id.
15. The killing of Dr. Gunn, an abortion clinic doctor, in March of 1994 is one example.
See Clinic Doctor, supra note 4, at Al. See also United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446
(7th Cir. 1983) (Defendant kidnapped Dr. Zevallos and his wife because he performed
abortions); United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840
(1983) (involving the murders and bombings of individuals who supported the Yugoslavian
government by Defendant Croatians).
16. 116 CONG. REC. 35,206 (1970). In 1970, protest attracted Representative Clancy's
attention as he discussed such protest jeopardizing the safety and education of the majority.
Id.
17. Northeastern Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989) (the Center lost its lease, lost business, and had to expend
additional money for security).
18. One way used to combat the activities of protesters is to seek injunctions. See Northeast
Women's Center, 868 F.2d at 1347 (where the Center sought injunctive relief in order to stop
the harassment by the defendants). See Grose, supra note 14, at 1532-37 (stating that
injunctions are adequate remedies against anti-abortion protesters' blockades of abortion
clinics); Carrie Miller, Case Comment, Abortion, Protest, and Constitutional Protection -
Bering v. Share, 106 Wn. 2d 212, 721 P.2d 918 (1986), 62 WASH. L. REV. 311 (1987)
(providing a general discussion of injunctions as applied to protesters).
19. See generally G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections
Fall/Winter 1995]
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Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA). 20 The
OCCA was designed to create tools that the Federal government could use to
attack organized crime and its detrimental effect on the nation's economy.
2 1
RICO, added to the OCCA by Chapter 96, Title IX, was one such tool
designed to assault organized crime in both the criminal and civil arenas. The
criminal component of RICO designates specific activity as criminal.2 2 The
civil component allows those injured by RICO offenders to sue for civil dam-
ages.2 3 Because civil actions arise directly from the enumerated criminal
on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237 (1982) (providing a detailed review of
RICO's history); G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts - Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMPLE L.Q.
1009, 1014-21 (1980); Strafer, supra note 7, at 681-83.
20. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. (84 Stat.) 1073 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-68 (1988)).
21. In the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, the Statement of Findings and Purpose is
as follows:
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly
sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars
from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and
corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money
obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft
and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other
dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are
increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to
subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activities in the
United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent
investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden
interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the
general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized crime continues to
grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the
development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other
sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are
unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by
establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanction and new
remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.
Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Star. 922 (1970) [hereinafter Statement of Findings and Purpose].
22. Gerard E. Lynch, A Conceptual, Practical, and Political Guide to RICO Reform, 43
VAND. L. REV. 769, 776 (1990) (explaining the framework of criminal RICO). See generally
Blakey & Gettings, supra note 19, at 1033-37 (criminal RICO).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) provides:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962
of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and
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offenses, RICO's civil component is only as broad in scope as its criminal
component .24
While RICO's purpose initially focused on organized crime, that is not
its only application.2 5 RICO has been interpreted to be broad in scope, 2
6
extending far beyond the organized crime arena.
21
Courts' Interpretation of RICO
Congressional records, statutory language and legislative history
indicate that Congress intentionally drafted civil RICO to be a broad provi-
sion. 28 The language itself has been a critical factor used by the courts in
determining the applicability of RICO to various situations. 29 If the language
proves to be unambiguous, courts will follow the statute's plain meaning."
Congress deliberately drafted RICO's language3 to create a statute effective
against crime detrimental to society.3 2 One commentator stated, "[I]n enact-
See generally Blakey, supra note 19, at 261; Strafer, supra note 7; Note, Civil RICO: The
Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101 (1982) [hereinafter
Judicial Restriction].
24. See Lynch, supra note 22, at 776.
25. 116 CONG. REC. 35,206 (1970). Rep. Clancy stated that all forms of crime needed to
be dealt with ("Organized crime, indeed all forms of crime, today offer a challenge to this
nation."). See also H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248 (1989)
("But Congress for cogent reasons chose to enact a more general statute, one which, although
it had organized crime as its focus, was not limited in application to organized crime.").
26. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985) ("This less restrictive reading
is amply supported by our prior cases and the general principles surrounding this statute.
RICO is to be read broadly."). See generally Blakey, supra note 19 (concluding that RICO's
legislative history demonstrates that the statute is not limited but broad).
27. See Sedima 473 U.S. at 497 (1985) (extending RICO to defendants not already criminally
convicted); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) (extending RICO to legitimate
enterprises).
28. The intent to make RICO a broad measure is evidenced by Sen. McClellan's statement
that "[i]t is impossible to draw an effective statute which reaches most of the commercial
activities of organized crime, yet does not include offenses commonly committed by persons
outside organized crime as well." 116 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1970).
29. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)
("We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for
interpreting statutes is the language of the statute itself."). See generally Craig W. Palm,
Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 167, 169-75 (1980)
(discussing statutory interpretation).
30. See Palm, supra note 29, at 170.
31. The broad language is set out in 18 U.S.C. § 1961, which gives the definitions of many
key terms, such as "enterprise," that appear in the text of the RICO provisions. See Haroco,
Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 473 U.S.
606 (1985) ("RICO also defines 'person' and 'enterprise' very broadly."). See generally
Blakey, supra note 19, at 240-48 (discussing RICO's text).
32. See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
FallI/Winter 1995]
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ing RICO, Congress intended to curtail and ideally eliminate the debilitating
effect of racketeering activity on American society .... To effectively attack
these perceived evils, Congress enacted a very broad and stringent statute." "
As a result of RICO's construction, courts have steadfastly tried to impose re-
strictions on its reach.34 However, the United States Supreme Court has con-
sistently determined RICO's language to be unambiguous in its scope, thus re-
jecting any restrictions imposed by lower courts.3 5
Courts have also emphasized the presence in the statute of what has been
termed the "liberally construed" clause.36 This express provision states that
RICO is to be read broadly to effectuate its purpose.3 7 Courts have interpreted
this clause as preventing a narrow view of RICO."s This clause appears to
have accomplished its purpose, as it is often cited by the Supreme Court when
the Court applies RICO to new areas.
RICO's language is viewed as unambiguous,3 9 yet courts and legal
scholars often probe further into its legislative history. Upon review of
RICO's history, one commentator suggested that "RICO's reach extends
beyond its primary target, the 'big fish' of organized crime, and threatens to
ensnare some 'minnows' as well.4 ° Courts agree that the legislative history
demonstrates that Congress was well aware of RICO's broad scope and im-
plications. 4 Senator McClellan, a proponent of RICO, stated that "Congress
1002 (1983) ("We believe that such dramatic consequences are necessary incidents of the
deliberately broad swath Congress chose to cut in order to reach the evil it sought . .
33. Palm, supra note 29, at 183.
34. The lower courts in many cases tried to impose limitations on RICO's breadth. However,
those limitations were rejected upon review by the Supreme Court. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985) (refusing to apply RICO only to a Defendant who had already
been criminally convicted); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) (refusing to limit
RICO to strictly "legitimate" enterprises). See generally Gary S. Abrams, The Civil RICO
Controversy Reaches The Supreme Court, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 147, 154-59 (1984) (discussing
judicial attempts to limit RICO's scope); Judicial Restriction, supra note 23 (opposing
restrictions on RICO).
35. See, e.g., Sedima 473 U.S. at 499; Turkette, 452 U.S. at 481.
36. This clause can be found in The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452,
84 Stat. 947, § 904(a) (1970). See generally Palm, supra note 29 (providing a general analysis
on liberal construction clause).
37. 84 Stat. 947, § 904(a). The exact language states: "The provisions of this title shall be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Id.
38. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1172 (1993) ("The clause obviously seeks to
ensure that Congress' intent is not frustrated by an overly narrow reading of the statute.").
See Palm, supra note 29, at 184 ("Congress provided a liberal construction clause to ensure
that RICO would have the greatest possible impact on the problem of racketeering.").
39. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
40. Strafer, supra note 7, at 682.
41. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) (stating that
Congress knew its language was capable of extending into areas other than organized crime);
[Vol. 28:2
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in fulfilling its proper legislative role must examine not only individual in-
stances, but whole problems. In that connection, it has a duty not to engage
in piecemeal legislation."42 Such a statement is indicative of Congress'
intention to cast a broad net. Legislative history also implies that, if Congress
had desired to impose restrictions, it would have mentioned such restrictions
in the statute itself.4 3 One commentator concludes that "[a]s with the statu-
tory language, this silence [in legislative history] leads to the conclusion that
Congress never intended to make an economic requirement. 44
While alerted to its dangerously broad scope, Congress enacted RICO
without limitation.45 The resulting effects of RICO are dramatic. However,
that was the intention of Congress as it believed RICO's broad construction
was necessary to control the adverse effects of certain crimes on society.46
Courts consistently hold that they will restrict neither RICO's reach nor its
application, as to do so would be contrary to Congressional intent.
47
The First Amendment
"Classic First Amendment law divides the world of expressive conduct
into two parts: that which is protected by the Constitution and that which is
not." 4" Because protest as a form of expression embraces the essential
constitutional value of freedom of speech, 49 it warrants protection by the
First Amendment. 50 Even speech concerning fervently debated public issues,
such as abortion, will be afforded protection in order to serve an individual's
interest in self-expression.5
Schachet v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that legislative history shows
Congress knew of RICO's far-reaching implications).
42. 116 CONG. REC. 18,914 (1970) (statement by Senator McClellan).
43. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. lmrex Co. Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 490 (1985) (had limitations been
intended, it would have been mentioned in the statute). But see id. (Powell, J., dissenting)
(stating that the limitation is apparent in the phrase "organized crime").
44. Adam D. Gale, Note, The Use of Civil RICO Against Antiabortion Protesters and the
Economic Requirement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1341, 1358 (1990).
45. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 577, 587 (1981) (stating that Congress enacted
RICO despite objections to its broadness).
46. See supra note 32.
47. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587 (asserting that because Congress intended a broad statute, it
is not in the courts authority to restrict RICO's application). Id.; Abrams, supra note 34, at
178 (stating the general principle that statutory correction should be left to Congress); Judicial
Restriction, supra note 23 (discussing restrictions).
48. Ledewitz, supra note 10, at 67.
49. Id; Miller, supra note 18, at 311.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . I..." d.
51. See Miller, supra note 18, at 311-12.
Fall/Winter 1995]
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However, a tenuous line has been drawn between legal, protected pro-
test and that which is not protected. Peaceful protest, such as leafleting and
peaceful picketing, will be protected. 52 In the anti-abortion context, protest-
ers will be protected "to the extent that they do not harass patients and clinic
staff and to the extent that they leave open access to the clinics."53 But pro-
test can lose protection by the First Amendment when it becomes violent and
threatens the constitutional rights of others.14 Such unprotected activity can
include forced entry onto clinic property and obstructing access to that prop-
erty.55 When protesters employ violent means to further their message, they
have crossed that line and may no longer be afforded first amendment protec-
tion.5 6
The limitation as to violent protest does not infringe upon an individual's
first amendment rights. An often cited case standing for this proposition is
Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle.5 7 In that case, the Third
Circuit held:
The First Amendment, which guarantees individuals freedom of con-
science and prohibits governmental interference with religious beliefs,
does not shield from government scrutiny practices which imperil public
safety, peace or order ....
[T]he First Amendment does not offer a sanctuary for violators. The same
constitution that protects the defendants' right to free speech, also protects
the Center's right to abortion services and the patients' rights to receive
those services."
In Northeast Women's Center, the court held that the Defendants' activities
did indeed exceed the boundaries of the First Amendment.
59
Most recently, the United States Supreme Court upheld an injunction
against anti-abortion protesters. 60 The Court stated that rights granted under
the First Amendment will not protect activity engaged in for the sole purpose
52. See Gale, supra note 44, at 1370 (citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176-77
(1983)).
53. Gale, supra note 44, at 1371.
54. See Ledewitz, supra note 10, at 69.
55. See Gale, supra note 44, at 1370-71.
56. See Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1348-49 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1349.
59. Id. ("[D]efendants' actions went beyond mere dissent and publication of their political
views.").
60. Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2530 (1994).
[Vol. 28:2
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of depriving others of their constitutional rights. 6' Thus, while the right to
express one's opinion is a fundamental privilege preserved by the Constitu-
tion, it is not absolute.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Lower Courts
Plaintiffs National Organization for Women (NOW)62 and two women's
health centers filed a complaint 63 against Defendants, anti-abortion organiza-
tions and protesters, asserting violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act 64 and
RICO.65 The complaint alleged that the Defendants "conspired to drive
women's health centers that perform abortions out of business through a
pattern of concerted, unlawful activity. ' 66 Some of the activities complained
of included threatening and intimidating clinic personnel and patients, tres-
passing on clinic property, damaging clinic equipment, forming blockades,
preventing appointments at the clinics from being made by tying up the tele-
phone lines and making false appointments, and establishing competing preg-
nancy testing and counseling facilities near the clinics.67 Because such unlaw-
ful activity interfered with legitimate business, the Plaintiffs sought relief
from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 61
Claims under various sections of RICO were set forth in the complaint.
The Plaintiffs' first allegation involved a violation of section 1962(a) in which
it is unlawful to receive income derived from a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity. 69 The Plaintiffs suggested that the Defendants' publicity-seeking activi-
61. Id.
62. NOW is a national nonprofit organization supporting women's rights, including the
right to have an abortion.
63. National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, 938 (N.D. I11. 1991),
aff'd, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994). "The amended complaint
alleged that the respondents were members of a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion
clinics[.]" Id. at 801.
64. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 941. Because the United States Supreme Court only dealt
with the RICO counts of the complaint, the Sherman Act violations will not be addressed in
this Note. The District Court concluded that the Sherman Act did not apply and dismissed the
Plaintiffs' claims regarding the anti-trust counts. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment. 968 F.2d 612, 623.
65. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 938 (RICO claims initially brought under 18 U.S.C. §§
1962(a), (b) & (d)).
66. Id. (some of the alleged activity included threatening personnel and patients, trespass,
and property damage).
67. Id. at 938-39.
68. Id. at 938.
69. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988).
Fall/Winter 1995]
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ties generated anti-abortion supporters' contributions, thus fulfilling the in-
come requirement.7" The second RICO claim was brought under section
1962(c) which requires conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of rack-
eteering activity.71 In response, Defendants filed a timely motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.72 They asserted
that RICO requires activity to be economically motivated.73 The Defendants
further stated that RICO did not apply to their activities as they acted for
social, political and moral reasons.74
The District Court analyzed the various RICO claims75 and granted the
Defendants' motion to dismiss.7 6 In this decision, the District Court con-
cluded that the Defendants' racketeering activity neither generated income, 77
nor was based on economic motivation.78
Plaintiffs then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. 79 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section
2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the
establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
§ 1962(a).
70. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 941 (stating that the more outrageous the activity, the more
likely that the group would receive large donations).
71. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
It shall be unlawful for a person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
§ 1962(c).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 12.
73. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 941-42. Among the circuits that have addressed this issue,
there has been a split. See generally Gale, supra note 44, at 1348-49 (providing a thorough
explanation).
74. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 939.
75. In this case, the violation of RICO alleged by Plaintiffs arose under the Hobbs Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1951. RICO classifies violations of the Hobbs Act as predicate offenses to RICO 18
U.S.C. § 1961. See Gale, supra note 44, at 1346-47 (explaining how a violation can arise
under the Hobbs Act).
76. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 937.
77. Id. at 941 ("The court believes that the receipt of donations from supporters of the
Defendant organizations does not constitute income derived from a pattern of racketeering
activity.").
78. Id. at 944 ("The motivation ... was not to obtain money, but rather to otherwise further
their anti-abortion cause").
79. National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 614 (7th Cir. 1992),
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Court and dismissed the RICO allegations. 80 It stated that income received by
the Defendants was not derived from racketeering activity." Furthermore, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to prove any economic
motivation on behalf of the Defendants.
82
United States Supreme Court
The Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Supreme Court and on June
14, 1993 were granted certiorari. 83 The Supreme Court examined the actual
language and the legislative history of the RICO statute.84 It made specific
reference to the fact that nowhere does RICO's language require an "enter-
prise" to have an economic motivation.8 5 The Court also referred to guidelines
for RICO issued by the Department of Justice which provides that an enter-
prise must be "directed toward an economic or other identifiable goal." 8 6
Anti-abortion sentiment would likely fall into the category of "other identi-
fiable goals."
The Court then considered RICO's general purpose to eliminate activ-
ity that adversely effects society.87 In the Court's opinion, Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that "[a]n enterprise surely can have a detrimental influence
on interstate or foreign commerce without having its own profit-seeking
motives." 88 Applying RICO only to economically-motivated enterprises
would create a less effective provision. 89 Upon review, the Supreme-Court
stated that its refusal to confine RICO would stand, as the legislative history
rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
80. Id. at 630-31.
81. Id. at 625 (stating that the causal connection between the Defendants' activities and
income received was insufficient).
82. Id. at 630 (the economic effect that Defendants' activity had on the Plaintiffs does not
fulfill the economic requirement of § 1962(c)).
83. National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 113 S. Ct. 2958 (1993) (cert. granted),
rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
84. National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 803-06 (1994).
85. Id. at 804 ("Nowhere in either § 1962(c), or in the RICO definition in § 1961, is there
any indication that an economic motive is required.").
86. Id. at 805 (referring to U.S. Dept. of Justice, United States Attorney's Manual § 9-
110.360 (March 9, 1984)).
87. Statement of Findings and Purpose, supra note 21.
88. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 804. See United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 54 (2d Cir.
1983) (stating that, whether Defendants acted upon economic or political motives, the effect
on the nation's economy is same).
89. 116 CONG. REC. 18,940 (statement by Senator McClellan). "It is self-defeating to
attempt to exclude from any list of offenses such as that found in title IX all offenses which
commonly are committed by persons not involved in organized crime." Id.
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suggests no "clearly expressed intent to the contrary." 9o
Consistent with RICO's statutory language and legislative history, the
Court found there to be no economic requirement that would prevent the
Plaintiffs from going forward with their case.9 1 Thus, the Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 92
ANALYSIS
A. RICO Interpreted Broadly
The United States Supreme Court decision extending RICO to enter-
prises driven by non-economic motives parallels other Supreme Court deci-
sions that also refused to limit the scope of this statute. 93 In H.J. Inc. v. North-
western Bell Telephone Co.,94 the Court had to determine the applicability of
RICO to a telephone company that allegedly bribed the Senate body that sets
the company's billing rates.9 5 In construing the Act, the Court examined both
the text of RICO, as well as its legislative history.9 6 Following this method
of interpretation, RICO was determined to apply to the particular situation. 9
7
H.J. Inc. illustrates that the method of interpreting RICO remains the same,
whether the Court is determining if RICO is applicable to enterprises with
economic, political or social goals.
The Supreme Court did not deter from this path of interpretation in
deciding Scheidler.98 To determine if RICO's provisions were applicable to
anti-abortion protesters, the Court again examined the statutory language and
legislative history. 99 The Court concluded that the actual language of RICO
90. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 806 (1994) ("Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to
the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."). See also Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
91. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 806 ("We hold only that RICO contains no economic motive
requirement.").
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985); United States v. Turkette,
452 U.S. 576 (1981).
94. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 233 (1989).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 237-39.
97. Id. at 250 (holding that, under the analysis the Court set forth, the Petitioners could
continue with the RICO claims against the Respondents).
98. See generally National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
99. See supra note 84.
[Vol. 28:2
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 28 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 10
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol28/iss2/10
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN V. SCHEIDLER
is unambiguous,' yet further inquired into RICO's legislative history.''
RICO designates certain unwanted behavior as criminal in order to pre-
serve order in society. 0 2 In encouraging the enactment of RICO, Represen-
tative Clancy believed that such behavior could occur in the form of protest.
0 3
Consistent with this belief, he stated that "[t]he activities of a small group of
activists are jeopardizing the safety and education of the majority." 104 This
statement indicates that Congress envisioned RICO broad enough as to
encompass unruly protesters. 05 In cases subsequent to its enactment, the
purpose to keep society orderly has been consistently sustained as courts have
applied RICO to political, social and religious protest.10 6
In determining RICO to be broad, a key realization is that behavior
driven by non-economic motivation can still be illegal. 07 Enterprises not
seeking any economic benefit can fall under RICO's umbrella. Congress
purposely cast a wide net in order to capture the illegal activity enumerated
in RICO.' The underlying motivations of illegal activity are of no rel-
evance 0 9 as the effect of those activities remains the same."0 Whether the
driving force is economic or moral, such activity adversely affects the
Nation's economy and order."' One commentator stated that "[t]he motive[s]
behind the unlawful conduct cannot justify the crime." ' 2 Violent protest
cannot be allowed to persist and courts should refrain from inquiring into its
underlying motivations. 13 Such an inquiry would only serve to intensify the
100. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 806. ("We believe that statutory language is unambiguous").
101. id. at 805-06 (discussing legislative history of RICO).
102. See Statement of Findings and Purpose, supra note 21.
103. 116 CONG. REC. 35,206 (1970).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983) (RICO was applied against
activists motivated by political beliefs). Without a requirement of economic motivation,
RICO will be able to apply to many groups that were previously out of reach. See Antonio J.
Califa, RICO Threatens Civil Liberties, 43 VAND. L. REV. 805, 845 (1990).
107. 116 CONG. REC. 592 (1970) (Senator McClellan expressed concern that racketeering
can be found in non-profit organizations, such as charities and foundations.).
108. Activity that violates RICO is listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988) (examples include
kidnapping, arson, bribery and mail fraud).
109. Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 53 ("RICO demands no such inquiry. The offenses it proscribes
are, in the main, activities punishable irrespective of motives for performance."). See also
Gale, supra note 44, at 1345 ("[C]ongress purposefully worded the statute broadly enough so
that it could extend to anyone who committed the crimes enumerated in the predicate acts,
regardless of their motivation.").
110. See supra note 17.
111. See supra note 17.
112. See Pool, supra note 1, at 263.
113. Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 53 (stating that the offenses are punishable regardless of motives).
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prosecutions and trials surrounding such volatile issues." 4 This is especially
true of the abortion issue," 51 as protesters tend to be extreme in expressing their
beliefs.1 16
Furthermore, while restricting the scope of RICO would be contrary to
Congress' intent, it would also create loopholes." 17 Any restriction, in effect,
would be detrimental to RICO's intended purpose by allowing some violators
to go unprosecuted." 8 A restriction would also be counter-productive." 9
"Congress drafted RICO broadly enough to encompass a wide range of crimi-
nal activity, taking many different forms and likely to attract a broad array of
perpetrators operating in many different ways." 120 If civil RICO was applied
only to profit-seeking enterprises, it would be increasingly difficult for the
Government to stop non-economically oriented enterprises from engaging in
criminal activity.' 2 ' Without RICO, violent protesters may go unpunished and
undeterred. RICO was designed to fill these gaps, not to create them.
22
Congress' conscious policy choice to draft a broad provision demands
that courts refrain from restricting RICO's scope.'23 To read an economic
requirement into RICO's text would invalidate a vital tool utilized to keep
114. Id. at 54 ("Further, investigation into motive would serve only to politicize, and
otherwise inflame, RICO prosecutions.").
115. Id. Because abortion is such a controversial issue, most people either oppose or
support it. To inject this debate into court proceedings could not only sway jurors in one
direction, but could prejudice the case.
116. For example, during the trial of Griffin, Dr. Gunn's murderer, one protester picketed
near the courthouse carrying a sign stating, "Disobey unjust laws." This protester was later
responsible for the shootings of two others. William Claiborne, Two Killed at Clinic in
Florida; Radical Abortion Foe Charged in Shootings, WASH. POST, July 30, 1994, at Al.
117. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 390 (7th Cir. 1984)
(stating that "narrower terms would provide loopholes through which the primary targets of
RICO might escape").
118. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985) (stating that to impose
restrictions would in effect eliminate § 1964(c) from the statute).
119. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989) (stating that a
narrower interpretation of RICO would be counterproductive). See Abrams, supra note 34, at
176 (imposing certain requirements would defeat the purpose of RICO).
120. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 248-49.
121. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493 ("[T]he purpose [to control crime] would be largely
defeated, and the need for treble damages as an incentive to litigate unjustified, if private
suits could be maintained only against those already brought to justice.").
122. Id. at 493 ("Private attorney general provisions such as § 1964(c) are in part designed
to fill prosecutorial gaps."). See Abrams, supra note 34, at 176 ("Indeed, the 'private attorney
general' theory of civil RICO and statutes like it is based on the notion that these statutes are
needed to fill in the gaps left by the government's failure to prosecute certain situations.").
123. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981) (stating that courts do not have
the authority to restrict RICO).
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protesters in check.'24 Clearly, Congress did not intend to cripple the effec-
tiveness of the government in managing illegal activity.'25 While protesters
are free to express their opinions and beliefs, they cannot endanger the whole
of society. 2 6 Activities prohibited by RICO are illegal in any arena, whether
it is political, social or economic. RICO provides society with the means to
combat the threats such activity presents to peace and order. The Supreme
Court's decision refusing to impose restrictions on RICO is consistent with
the statute's purpose.'27 The Court did not exceed its authority in applying
RICO to violent anti-abortion protesters when, as in this case, they threaten
the order of society. 28
B. First Amendment Implications
While the Court properly applied RICO to such violent protest, its deci-
sion raises other issues concerning the First Amendment and the potential for
the "chilling effect" on an individual's right to protest.
Violent Protest is not Protected by the First Amendment
In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter suggests that courts should
consider First Amendment rights when applying RICO to violent protest.
2 9
He expresses no opinion about a potential First Amendment claim by the
protesters in NOW v. Scheidler, but stresses that the Supreme Court's decision
would not prohibit such a challenge. 130 Thus, an inquiry must be made as to
whether the First Amendment right to free speech is violated when RICO is
applied to the activities of violent anti-abortion protesters.
The freedom to express one's opinion is preserved by the First Amend-
ment. 3' In this case, NOW insists that its challenge is not aimed at the pro-
124. Note that RICO is not a tool to prohibit the protesters' freedom of speech, but a tool
to control their illegal activities in furtherance of those beliefs.
125. Statement of Findings and Purpose, supra note 21.
126. See supra note 15. Many incidents and cases have demonstrated the lengths to which
protesters will go to promote their beliefs.
127. See Statement of Findings and Purpose, supra note 21.
128. National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 1992).
Some of the activities complained of were physical and verbal intimidation, threats to clinic
personnel, trespass upon and damage to property, and blockades.
129. National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 807 (1994) ("But I
think it would be prudent to notice that RICO actions could deter protected activity and to
caution courts applying RICO to bear in mind the First Amendment interests that could be at
stake.").
130. Id. at 806 ("[Tlhe Court's opinion does not bar First Amendment challenges to RICO's
application in particular cases.").
131. U.S. Const. amend. 1. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
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testers' right to publicize their anti-abortion views.132 Instead, it is directed
at the protesters' right to engage in illegal and violent activity in furtherance
of this belief. 33
The First Amendment guarantees certain freedoms, but it does not allow
an individual to endanger peace and order.134 It does not extend protection to
violent protest.'35 The court in Northeast Women's Center stated that "the
First Amendment does not offer a sanctuary for violators [of laws]. The same
constitution that protects the defendants' right to free speech, also protects the
Center's right to perform abortion services and the patient's rights to receive
those services." 136 While peaceful protest is protected, violent protest em-
ploying illegal means is not.'37 One commentator asserted that "[s]ome activi-
ties plainly are not covered by the first amendment, no matter the expressive
political content of those acts." 138 Among activities commonly listed as un-
protected are arson, firebombing and trespass. 3 9 In Scheidler, NOW alleged
that the protesters had engaged in each of these acts. 40 Protesters cannot use
their political beliefs as a shield when their activity is illegal.14' When an act's
expressive content is minimal, it will not be afforded first amendment protec-
tion.142
Chilling Effect Is Minimal
One commentator suggests that "[I]f protesters do not violate RICO,
then RICO's restrictions do not violate the protesters' first amendment rights.
It is important to realize that RICO does not impose liability on any act that
speech .... " Id.
132. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3.
133. See Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342-45 (3d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989) ("The Center has emphasized throughout this litigation that
it is not challenging Defendants' free speech right to make public their opposition to
abortion.").
134. United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 765, 772 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1092 (1983) (stating that the First Amendment will not protect practices that endanger public
safety, peace and order from government inspection).
135. See Gale, supra note 44, at 1370.
136. Northeast Women's Center, Inc., 868 F.2d at 1349.
137. See Califa, supra note 106, at 823-24 (but draws a distinction between pure protected
speech, unprotected conduct, and mixed conduct); Ledewitz, supra note 10, at 67
(distinguishing between protected and unprotected speech).
138. Califa, supra note 106, at 824.
139. Id.
140. See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 3, at 7.
141. Pool, supra note 1, at 256.
142. Califa, supra note 106, at 828 n.122 (showing the minimal expressive content in
United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1983), in which the defendant kidnapped
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was not already a crime." 143 Violations of RICO are crimes and the Consti-
tution cannot protect criminal behavior. 144
Other commentators advance the argument that the possibility of a pend-
ing RICO violation may deter peaceful protesters from expressing their be-
liefs.141 Such a deterrent is commonly known as the "chilling effect". 146 The
theory behind the "chilling effect" is that the harm of deterring free speech
greatly outweighs the harm that could result from deterring other activities. 147
However, not all protest is subject to RICO, and the effect on protest is mini-
mal at best. 48 One spokesperson for People for Ethical Treatment of Animals,
Inc. stated that "[a]nimal activists use peaceful and nonviolent means ....
Their voice will not be diminished by today's decision [in Scheidler]." "'
This statement indicates that peaceful protesters will not be "chilled". If
protesters become subject to RICO, they have already engaged in illegal ac-
tivity.5 0 For example, a protester who sets fire to a clinic has already engaged
in the crime of arson. The protester's awareness that arson is a crime failed
to deter or "chill" such activity. An additional RICO violation would likely
not engender the chilling effect in the protester.' Protesters "realize before-
hand that they are violating the law and therefore may be subject to liabil-
ity." 52 Thus, if protesters are engaging in peaceful, legal means, they will not
be chilled from expressing their beliefs about abortion.'53
While a First Amendment challenge to RICO involving a non-profit
enterprise has not yet been raised, such a challenge would likely fail. 154 The
an abortion doctor and his wife at gunpoint).
143. Gale, supra note 44, at 1371-72.
144. See id. at 1371.
145. See generally Califa, supra note 106.
146. See generally Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage,
66 MINN. L. REV. 11 (1981) (discussing the "chilling effect" and prior restraint theory);
Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808 (1969) (providing a
detailed discussion of the "chilling effect" and the First Amendment).
147. Califa, supra note 106, at 833.
148. Gale, supra note 44, at 137 1-72.
149. Dan Freedman, Abortion Foes lose, 9-0; Court lets Racketeering Law Apply to
Protesters, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Jan. 25, 1994, at Al.
150. Gale, supra note 44, at 1372 ("[A]ll protesters who can be sued under RICO will at
least have been blockading a clinic.").
151. This example follows the line of reasoning set forth by Adam Gale. See Gale, supra
note 44.
152. Gale, supra note 44, at 1372.
153. Id. at 1370 ("In general, activity protected by the first amendment cannot be crim-
inalized.").
154. See Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1348-49 (3d Cir. 1989)
(the court stated that the Defendants' actions went beyond the First Amendment protection).
See generally Gale, supra note 44.
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The unanimous Supreme Court decision in Scheidler further expands the
boundaries of civil RICO to encompass non-economically motivated enter-
prises. RICO can now be applied to social protesters, such as the anti-abor-
tionists in this case, when they engage in violent activity. Consequently,
RICO could also be used in suits involving animal rights activists and anti-
nuclear protesters,5 6 should they employ violent means.
While RICO was initially thought to only deal with organized crime, its
textual language and legislative history indicate that Congress envisioned a
much broader scope. 157 Because Congress chose to enact a far-reaching
provision, it is not in the Court's authority to restrict RICO's reach.'58
SUZANNE WENTZEL
155. See Califa, supra note 106, at 828 n.122.
156. Califa, supra note 106, at 845 (the author also points out that many of the anti-Vietnam
war protesters would have been subject to RICO). See also Supreme Court Ruling; Protesting
RICO, ARiz. REPUB., Jan. 26, 1994 at B6 (stating that animal and environmental activists
may be affected).
157. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
158. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981) (asserting that because Congress
drafted a broad provision, it is not up to the courts to restrict RICO).
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